Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University
Con to the question "Do Electronic Voting Machines Improve the Voting Process?"
"From a computer security standpoint, DREs have much in common with desktop PCs. Both suffer from many of the same security and reliability problems, including bugs, crashes, malicious software, and data tampering. Despite years of research and enormous investment, PCs remain vulnerable to these problems, so it is doubtful, unfortunately, that DRE vendors will be able to overcome them... Experience with the [Diebold] AccuVote-TS and paperless DREs shows that they are prone to very serious vulnerabilities."
"Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine," Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology, Aug. 2007
Experts Election officials, people with post-graduate degrees in a computer or political science, JD's, Members of Congress, or elected officials with significant involvement in, or related to, electronic voting machine issues. [Note: Experts definition varies by site.]
Involvement and Affiliations:
Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs, Princeton University, 1993-present
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) U.S. Public Policy Committee, 2004-present
Cowritten with A. Feldman, and J.A. Halderman, "Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine," available at Princeton University Center for Information Technology Policy website, Sep. 13, 2006
Freedom to Tinker, 2005
"Mechanisms for Secure Modular Programming in Java," L. Bauer, A.W. Appel, and E.W. Felten, Software - Practice and Experience, 2003