Associate Professor of Computer Science at Rice University
Con to the question "Do Electronic Voting Machines Improve the Voting Process?"
"I have come to the conclusion that paperless electronic voting systems, also called 'direct recording electronic' or 'DRE' systems, are fundamentally insecure and do not provide sufficient protections against the sorts of fraudulent behavior that have been historically used to manipulate the outcomes of elections in the U.S."
Testimony before the Ohio Joint Committee on Ballot Security, Mar. 18, 2004
Experts Election officials, people with post-graduate degrees in a computer or political science, JD's, Members of Congress, or elected officials with significant involvement in, or related to, electronic voting machine issues. [Note: Experts definition varies by site.]
Involvement and Affiliations:
Associate Professor of Computer Science and Electrical and Computer Engineering, Rice University
Associate Director, A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections (ACCURATE)
Testified before NIST/EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee, Texas Senate Committee on State Affairs, Texas House Elections Committee, and Ohio Joint Committee on Ballot Security regarding electronic voting systems
Member, National Committee for Voting Integrity
PhD, Computer Science, Princeton University, 1998
MA, Computer Science, Princeton University, 1995
BS, Computer Science, University of California at Berkeley, 1993
"Texas Must Confront Voting Systems' Flaws," Austin American-Statesman, Sep. 2004
Cowritten with J. Bannet, D.W. Price, A. Rudys, J. Singer, and D.S. Wallach, "Hack-a-Vote: Demonstrating Security Issues with Electronic Voting Systems," IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine, Jan./Feb. 2004
Cowritten with A. Rubin, D.S. Wallach, T. Kohno, and A. Stubblefield, "Analysis of an Electronic Voting System," Johns Hopkins Information Security Institute Technical Paper, 2003